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The procedure for admitting and excluding evidence at
trial plays a critical role in criminal litigation. If a record is
not made at trial, there will be no basis for an appeal.
Article I of the Ohio Rules of Evidence governs this area
of law. Rule 103 covers rulings on evidence. Rule 104
governs preliminary question of admissibility. Rule 105
codifies the concept of limited admissibility.
RULE 103: RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
Ohio Evidence Rule 103 specifies the procedures
relating to rulings on evidentiary issues. It covers such
matters as plain and harmless error, objections, offers of
proof, and out-of-court hearings.

Harmless Error
Rule 103(A) provides that a case will not be reversed
on appeal because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling
unless the ruling involves a "substantial right" and the
other procedural requirements of Rule 103, such as timely objection, have been satisfied. The term "substantial
right" is not defined in the rule, but the Staff Note indicates that the term refers to the harmless error doctrine.
The Criminal Rules contain a provision on harmless
error. Crim. R. 52(A) reads: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded." See 2 Schroeder-Katz, Criminal
Law, Crim. R. 52. See a/so Ohio App. R. 12(8) (effect of
prejudicial error).
In criminal trials, errors involving federal constitutional
rights must be judged by the federal standard. Under this
standard, the state must "prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967). See generally, 88 Moore's Federal Practice Ch.
52 (1987); Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal
Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976); Saltzburg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1973).
The Ohio Supreme Court has extended application of
the federal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a
review of nonconstitutional errors in criminal cases. In
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035

(1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978), the
Supreme Court wrote:
Error in the admission of evidence in criminal proceedings is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility
that the evidence may have contributed to the
accused's conviction. In order to hold the error harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. /d.
(syllabus, para. 7).
Accord, State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 193,503
N.E.2d 147 (1986) (hearsay); State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio
St.3d 146, 151, 492 N.E.2d 401 (1986) (privileged testimony); State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 40, 482 N.E.2d
592 (1985) ("other-act" evidence).
The Supreme Court has recognized a difference
between bench and jury trial cases for purposes of applying the harmless error doctrine. In State v. Eubank, 60
Ohio St.2d 183, 398 N.E.2d 567(1979), the Court stated
that in determining whether error has been harmless "we
may give weight to the fact that the error occurred in a
trial to the court, rather than in a jury trial .... Indeed, a
judge is presumed to consider only the relevant, material
and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record."
/d. at 187. See a/so State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151,
239 N.E.2d 65 (1968); State v. Austin, 52 Ohio App.2d 59,
70, 368 N.E.2d 59 (1976).
Objections
Rule 103(A)(1) requires that an objection or motion to
strike be made in order to preserve a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence. This rule serves several
purposes. First, the objection alerts the trial court to the
nature of the claim of error, thus facilitating a ruling on
the objection and providing an opportunity for corrective
action. Second, it affords opposing counsel an opportunity to take corrective measures. For example, opposing
counsel, in response to an objection, might be able to
rephrase the question in unobjectionable terms or might
withdraw the question and present unobjectionable
evidence through another witness.
A failure to object or to move to strike is considered to
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be a waiver of the objection, and the issue will not be
reviewed on appeal. See State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d
88, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981}; State v. Williams, 51 Ohio
St.2d1i2, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978}; State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St.2d
77, 358 N.E.2d 1081 (1976), vacated on other grounds,
438 U.S. 911 (1978}. Withdrawal of an objection also constitutes a waiver. See Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio
App.2d 21, 32, 371 N.E.2d 557 (1977). Moreover, where a
court fails to rule on an objection, it will be presumed that
the court overruled the objection. Kane v. Ford Motor Co.,
17 Ohio App.3d-111, 112, 477 N.E.2d 662 (1984).
In Bradyv. Stafford, 115 Ohio St. 67, 152N.E 188
(1926}, the Supreme Court recognized the efficacy of
"continuing objections," thereby removing the need to
object iepeatedly to a line of testimony after an adverse
ruling on an earlier objection:
Where there has been a sufficient and specific objection to the admission of testimony concerning a
conversation, which is overruled ... , it is not necessary to repeat the objection whenever testimony of the
same class is offered as to the same conversation in
order that the admission of such testimony may be
urged as a ground of error in a reviewing court. /d.
(syllabus, para.2).
See also McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984}.
Caution, however, demands periodic statements that the
prior objection still pertains; otherwise, counsel runs the
risk that an appellate court may construe a continuing
failure to object as a waiver.
Another consequence of failing to object is that the
admitted evidence becomes part of the record of trial and
may be co_nsidered by the trier of fact, by the trial court in
ruling on motions, and by a reviewing court. See State v.
Petro, 148 Ohio St. 473, 76 NE2d 355 (1947); Hastings v.
Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1978); Unhed
States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978};
United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th
Cir. 1977); McCormick, Evidence§ 54 (3d ed. 1984).

motion to strike is granted, the court should instruct the
jury to disregard the evidence. See Logan v. Cleveland
Railway Co., 107 Ohio St. 211, 140 N.E. 652 (1923); Ohio
Jury Instructions§ 5.20 and 405.10.
For some purposes, "timeliness" requires that an
objection be made prior to trial. For example, objections
based on violations of constitutional rights must often be
made in the form of pretrial motions to suppress. Grim, R.
12(8}(3) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evidence,
including but not limited to statements and identification
testimony, on the ground that it was illegally obtained"
must be raised prior to trial.
Specificity
Rule 103 requires specific objections; that is, statement of the grounds upon which the objection is based
must accompany the objection unless the grounds are
apparent from the context. Statements such as "I
object," "Objection, inadmissible," and "Objection,
incompetent" are general objections. Objections on the
ground that evidence is ''incompetent, irreievant, and
immaterial" are also considered general objections. See'
McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984}.
All grounds for objection should be specified at the
time the objection is made. "The general rule regarding
specific objections is that one who has made specific
objections to the admission of evidence thereby waives
all other objections and cannot assert such others in the
appellate court." Johnson v. English, 5 Ohio App.2d 109,
113, 214 N.E.2d 254 (1966). See also Kent v. State, 42
Ohio St. 426, 430 (1884}; Gschwind v. Viers, 21 Ohio App.
124, 152 N.E. 911 (1925}.
The specificity requirement further demands that counsel indicate which particular portion of evidence is
objectionable. This aspect of the. specificity requirement
is rarely important with testimonial evidence but arises
frequently with respect to documentary evidence. Where
only part of a document is objectionable, counsel must
specify the objectionable parts. See Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 111, 100 N.E.2d 197
(1951); State v. Fox, 133 Ohio St. 154, 161-62, 12 N.E.2d
413 (1938) ("Whenever evidence is offered which is only
partially objectionable, the complaining party must point
out the objectionable portion specifically:').
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Timeliness of Objection
Rule 103(A)(1) requires that objections be timely. If a
question is improper, an objection should be made
immediately. See Gates v. Dills, 13 Ohio App.2d 163, 164,
234 N.E.2d 604 (1967} ("Ordinarily, an objection to
incompetent and improper testimony must be made with
reasonable promptness."); accord, Powell v. Turner, 16
Ohio App.3d 404, 407, 476 N.E.2d 368 (1984); State v.
Stearns, 7 Ohio App.3d 11, 15, 454 N.E.2d 139 (1982);
State v. McDonald, 25 Ohio App.2d 6, 11,265 N.E.2d 793
(1970). The rationale for this rule is that counsel should
not be permitted to wait and see whether the answer is
favorable before raising an objection. See McCormick,
Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984).
In some instances, however, a question's tendency to
elicit an objectionable response will not become apparent until the response is given. In such cases, a motion to
strike is required. Johnson v. English, 5 Ohio App.2d 109,
214 N.E.2d 254 (1966}. Moreover, if a trial court conditionally admits evidence subject to its being "connected up"
later in the trial, a motion to strike is required to remove
the evidence from jury consideration in the event the
"connecting up" evidence is never introduced. If a

Offers of Proof
When evidence has been excluded by a ruling of the
trial court, Rule 103(A)(2) requires an offer of proof in .
order to preserve the error for appeal. The rationale for
this rule is obvious. Without an offer of proof in the trial
record an appellate court cannot review the trial court's
ruling. Thus, in Pokorny v. Local 310 International Hod
Carriers, 35 Ohio App.2d 178, 300 N.E.2d 464 (1973),
reversed on other grounds, 38 Ohio Si.2d 177,311 N.E.2d
866 (1974), the court held:
When a court sustains objections to a question a statement must be made or proffered as to what the expected answer would be in order that a reviewing court can
determine whether or not the action of the trial court is
prejudicial; and in the absence of a proffer, the exclusiol
of evidence may not be assigned as error.ld. at 184.
See also State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d
142 (1986); State v. Hipkins, 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 430
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Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 103.
The purpose of the plain error doctrine is to "safeguard
the right of a defendant to a fair trial, notwithstanding his
failure to object ih timely fashion to error at that trial."
State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 327, 348 N.E.2d 351
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976). Grim. R. 52(B)
specifically recognizes the plain error doctrine in criminal
cases; it provides that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court."
The plain error rule applies only to errors that affect
substantial rights. Attempts to define the doctrine further
have not been particularly helpful. See State v. Clayton,
62 Ohio St.2d 45, 47, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 879 (1980) ("plain error is not easily or
readily definable and ... each case must be considered
on its own facts."). In State v. Craft, 52 Ohio App.2d 1, 367
N.E.2d 1221 (1977), the court defined plain error to be:
[O]bvious error prejudicial to a defendant, ... which
involves a matter of great public interest having
substantial adverse impact on the integrity of and the
public's confidence in judicial proceedings. The error
must be obvious on the records, palpable, and
fundamental, and in addition it must occur in exceptional circumstances where the appellate court acts in
the public interest because error affects "the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
/d. at 7.
See also Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d
207,209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982) ("A 'plain error' is obvious and prejudicial ... which, if permitted, would have a
material adverse affect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings."); State v. Long, 53 Ohio
St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978) (syllabus, para. 3)
("Notice of plain error ... is to be taken with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice."); State v.
Eiding, 57 Ohio App.2d 111, 385 N.E.2d 1332 (1978). See
generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. R.
52; 8B Moore's Federal Practice Ch. 52 (1987).

N.E.2d 943 (1982); State v. Chapin, 67 Ohio St.2d 437,
424 N.E.2d 317 (1981). In addition, the rule requires
counsel to articulate the theory of admissibility as well as
the content of the excluded evidence. See Reese v.
Mercury Marine Div., 793 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1986).
F
'
A party cannot be precluded from making an offer of
proof. "Counsel must be allowed to proffer excluded
.evidence. This is a prerequisite for appellate review on
evidentiary rulings .... To exclude a proffer of evidence
excluded on direct examination is reversible error." State
v. Hartford, 21 Ohio App.3d 29, 30, 486 N.E.2d 131 (1984).
An offer of proof may take several forms. An offer of
testimonial evidence typically takes the form of a statement by counsel as to the expected content of the excluded testimony. The court, however, may require or be
asked.to take the "offer" by an examination of the
witness, including cross-examination. See Rule 103(B)
(court "may direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form."); Bolenbaugh v. State, 22 Ohio Abs. 268,
270 (App. 1936); Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). Excluded documentary
evidence should be marked for identification and
appended to the record of trial.
There are several exceptions to the offer of proof
requirement. First, an offer is not necessary when the
substance of the excluded evidence is "apparent from
the context within which questions were asked." Rule
103(A)(2). See State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 503
N.E.2d 147 (1986). Second, unlike Federal Rule 103, Rule
103(A)(2) provides that an "[o]ffer of proof is not necessary if evidence is excluded during cross-examination."
Frequently, a cross-examiner, conducting a proper but
exploratory examination, will be unable to state what the
witness would have said if permitted to answer. In such
cases, to require an offer of proof would be unfair. See
Martin v. Elden, 32 Ohio St. 282 (1877); Burt v. State, 23
Ohio St. 394 (1872); State v. Debo, 8 Ohio App.2d 325,
222 N.E.2d 656 (1966). Finally, the offer of proof requirement is subject to the plain error doctrine.

Hearing of Jury
Rule 103(C) requires that discussions involving the
admissibility of evidence be held outside the hearing of
the jury whenever practicable. This requirement arises
from a recognition that the underlying purpose of an
exclusionary rule of evidence will be defeated if the jury
is exposed to the excluded evidence through an offer of
proof or by argument of counsel. The trial judge has
discretion to require either a side-bar conference or an
out-of-court hearing. In addition, evidentiary issues may
be raised prior to trial, either at a pretrial conference
(Grim. R. 17.1), or by means of a motion in limine.

Motions in limine
Although neither the Ohio nor Federal Rule explicitly
mentions motions in limine, the use of such motions to
raise objections prior to trial is common. The trial court's
authority to consider motions in limine under the Rules of
Evidence is found in Rule 611(A), which recognizes the
trial court's general authority to control the presentation
of evidence. See Rich v. Quinn, 13 Ohio App.3d 102, 105,
468 N.E.2d 365 (1983) (court has inherent authority to
entertain motions in limine).
In State v. Spahr, 47 Ohio App.2d 221,353 N.E.2d 624
(1976), the court commented on the use of motions in
limine:
There is no provision under the rules or the statutes for
a motion in limine. The request was no more and no
less than an appeal to the trial court for a precautionary instruction to opposing counsel to avoid error or
prejudice, such instruction to be effective until admissibility was resolved. Such a request lies in the inherent
power and discretion of the trial judge to control the
proceedings. /d. at 224.
In State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 142

Plain Error
Rule 103(0) recognizes the plain error doctrine, under
which an appellate court may consider an evidentiary
error despite a party's failure to make an objection, a
motion to strike, or an offer of proof at trial. As the federal
drafters noted, "the application of the plain error rule will
be more likely with respect to the admission of evidence
than to exclusion, since failure to comply with normal
requirements of offers of proof is likely to produce a record which simply does not disclose the error." Advisory
3

if the trial court's decision to admit the evidence is
erroneous, an appellate court is handicapped-in making
the required harmless error determination without knowing the nature of the defendant's testimony.

(1986), the Supreme Court wrote:
Thus, a motion in limine, if granted, is a tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling by the trial court reflecting its anticipatory treatment of the evidentiary issue.
In virtually all circumstances finality does not attach
when the motion is granted. Therefore, should circumstances subsequently develop at trial, the trial court is
certainly at liberty"... to consider the admissibility of
the disputed evidence in its actual context." /d. at
201-02.
Although a motion in limine is only a tentative ruling in
Ohio, it serves an important function. The motion may
prohibit opposing counsel frqm attempting to introduce
the evidence or from referring to it in the opening statement until the court has ruled finally on its admissibility.
See McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984).
Several procedural issues relating to motions in limine
have arisen. First, in order to preserve an evidentiary
issue for appeal an objection or offer of proof must be
made at trial. "At trial it is incumbent upon a defendant,
who has been temporarily restricted from introducing
evidence by virtue of a motion in limine, to seek the
introduction of the evidence by proffer or otherwise in
order to enable the court to make a final determination as
to its admissibility and to preserve any objection on the
record for purposes of appeal." State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio
St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 142 (1986) (syllabus, para. 2).
Accord, State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239,259-60, 473
N.E.2d 768 (1984).
Second, in some circumstances an in limine ruling in a
criminal case may be appealed by the prosecution.
Any motion, however labeled, which, if granted,
restricts the state in the presentation of certain
evidence and, thereby, renders the state's proof with
respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety
that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution
has been destroyed, is, in effect, a motion to suppress.
The granting of such a motion is a final order and may
be appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Grim. R.
12(J). State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio St.3d 132, 477 N.E.2d
1141 (1985) (syllabus).
Accord, State v. Fewerwerker, 24 Ohio App.3d 27, 492
N.E.2d 873 (1985).
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect of
a motion in limine in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38
(1984). During his trial for federal drug offenses, Luce
moved in limine to prevent the prosecution from using a
prior conviction to impeach him. His motion was based
on Federal Rule 609(a). The trial court denied the motion
but indicated that the nature of Luce's trial testimony
might affect its ruling. Luce did not testify at trial. He was
convicted and appealed.
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that Luce had
failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he had
not testified at trial: "We hold that to raise and preserve
for review the claim of improper impeachment with a
prior conviction, a defendant must testify." /d. at 43. The
Court set forth several reasons for its ruling. First, Federal Rule 609(a) requires the trial court to balance the
probative value of the prior conviction for impeachment
purposes against its prejudicial effect. Such an evaluation, in the Court's view, is impossible without knowing
the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. Second,

RULE 104:
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY
Rule 104(A) follows the traditional practice of allocating
to the trial court the responsibility for ruling on the admissibility of evidence. See Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, ,
500, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955) ("It is elementary that the trial
judge is to decide those questions of fact which must be
decided in order to determine whether certain evidence
is admissible."); Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 132
Ohio St. 78, 86,5 N.E.2d 153 (1936) ("The competency of
a witness is a question for the court."). Rule 104(8),
however, modifies this principle with respect to preliminary questions involving issues of conditional relevancy.
Pursuant to Rule 104(A), the trial court decides as a
preliminary matter questions concerning the "qualification of a person to be a witness," including the competenJ
cy of a witness under Rule 601 and the qualifications of
an expert under Rule 702. See Wagenheim v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App.3d 7, 18,482 N.E.2d 955 (1983)
(expert witness). The court also decides the "existence of
a privilege" under Rule 501. Finally, the court determines
as a preliminary matter the "admissibility of evidence,"
for example, whether a statement is hearsay under Rule
801, and if an exception to the hearsay rule applies under
Rules 803 and 804. See State v. Knight, 20 Ohio App.3d
289, 292, 485 N.E.2d 1064 (1984) (dying declaration);
State v. Snowden, 7 Ohio App.3d 358,361,455 N.E.2d
1058 (1982) (excited utterance). In short, the "admissibility of evidence" language entrusts all decisions concerning the application of evidentiary rules exclusively to the
trial court unless Rule 104(8) applies. See generally
Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165
(1929); Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927).
In some instances, a preliminary question concerning
the admissibility of evidence requires either a factual
determination or the application of a legal standard. In
other instances, resolution of the admissibility question
requires both. For example, the admissibility of statements falling within the hearsay exception for declarations against interest (Rule 804(8)(3)), depends upon the
unavailability of the declarant-a question of fact if
unavailability is based on the death of the declarant.
Admissibility also depends upon whether the statement
"possesses the required against-interest characteristics'~the application of a legal standard. Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104.
Application of Rules of Evidence
According to Rule 104(A) the trial court is "not bound
by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges" when ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Several arguments have been offered in support of
dispensing with evidentiary rules in this context. First,
the rules of evidence are designed principally for jury
4

does not decide such questions exclusively or with finality, as is the case with preliminary questions under Rule
104(A). Rather, the trial court determines only if sufficient
evidence has been introduced "to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition." If this prima facie standard is satisfied, the evidence is admitted for the jury's
consideration.
Rule 104(8) is a provision of general applicability.
Several specific rules represent specialized applications
of the concept of conditional relevancy. For example, in
applying the firsthand knowledge rule, the trial court
does not decide whether a witness has firsthand knowledge; the court decides only whether sufficient evidence
has been introduced "to support a finding that [the
witness] has personal knowledge of the matter." Rule
602. Similarly, when ruling on the authentication of a
document, the trial court does not decide whether the
proferred document is genuine; the court's decision is
limited to determining whether there is "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims." Rule 901(A).
The allocation of functions between the court and jury
which is embodied in the concept of conditional relevancy is based on the concern that entrusting preliminary
questions exclusively to the court will interfere with the
jury's proper role. The federal drafters commented: "If
preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were
determined solely by the judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would
be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually
destroyed. These are appropriate questions for juries."
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. Moreover,
unlike rules of competence, such as the hearsay rule,
there is little danger in permitting the jury to decide such
issues. For example, if the jury finds that a document is
not genuine or that a witness does not have firsthand
knowledge, the jury will disregard the evidence.

trials. McCormick writes: "Should the exclusionary law of
evidence, 'the child of the jury system' in Thayer's
phrase, be applied [in an admissibility] hearing before
the judge? Sound sense backs the view that it should
not, and that the judge should be empowered to hear any
relevant evidence, including affidavits or other hearsay."
McCormick, Evidence 136 n. 8 (3d ed. 1984). Second,
practical considerations support suspension of the rules.
"An item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on admissibility, though not yet admitted in
evidence. Thus the content of an asserted declaration
against interest must be considered in ruling whether it is
against interest. Again, common practice calls for
considering the testimony of a witness, particularly a
child, in determining competency." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. See genera/ly United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) ('~t a suppression
hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other
evidence, even though that evidence would not be
admissible at trial."); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 172-73(1974) ("[T]he rules of evidence normally
applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force
at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence."); Maguire and Epstein, Rules of Evidence
in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility,· 36 Yale L.
J. 1101 (1927).

Burden and Standard of Proof
Rule 104(A) provides that the trial court shall decide
preliminary questions and that the rules of evidence,
except those relating to privilege, are not applicable. The
rule, however, does not specify who has the burden of
proof on the preliminary question or what standard of
proof is applicable. As a general rule, the party offering
evidence has the burden of proof on preliminary issues.
"The opponent merely invokes the law; ... the proponent must make the evidence satisfy the law." 1
Wigmore, Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers rev. 1983). Also
as a general rule, the preponderance standard is the
standard of proof. See Bourjaily v. United States, 107
S.Ct. 2775, 2779 (1987). There are, however, exceptions in
criminal cases. See generally Saltzburg, Standards of
Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
271 (1975); 1 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 35
(1977).

Hearing of the Jury
Confessions. Rule 104(C), which requires the court to
hold an out-of-court hearing when ruling on the admissibility of a confession, is constitutionally mandated as a
result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See also State v.
Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969),
reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). This
provision should be invoked rarely because Grim. R.
12(8)(3) requires that constitutional challenges to the
admissibility of confessions be raised prior to trial by a
motion to suppress. There is little likelihood that a
confession will be introduced unexpectedly at trial
because Grim. R. 12(0)(2) entitles the defense, upon
request, to receive pretrial notice of the prosecutor's
intention to introduce a confession as evidence in chief.
See 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. R. 12.
Rule 104(C) wil_l more often be invoked where the
prosecution does not intend to introduce a confession in
its cal?e in chief but attempts to use the confession as
impeachment evidence. In this situation, Rule 104(C)
requires an out-of-court hearing on the admissibility of
the confession. Confessions obtained in violation of an
accused's Miranda rights may be used for impeachment.
See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New

Conditional Relevancy
Rule 104(8), governing preliminary questions of conditional relevancy, operates as an exception to Rule 104(A).
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence explained
conditional relevancy as follows:
In some situations, the relevancy of an item of
evidence, in the large sense, depends upon the existence of a particular preliminary fact. Thus when a
spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it
is without probative value unless X heard it. Or if a
letter purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish
an admission by him, it has no probative value unless
Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this sense has
been labeled "conditional relevancy."... Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104.
If a preliminary question involves an issue of conditional relevancy, the trial court's function is limited. The court
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York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Involuntary confessions,
however, cannot be used for impeachinenl.SeeMincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Other preliminary matters. Rule 104(C) provides that
hearings "on other preliminary matters shall also be
conducted out of the hearing of the jury when the
interests of justice require." A similar provision is found in
Rule 103(C). The la:tter provision, however, does not use
the interests-of-justice standard; rather, it requires out-ofcourt hearings whenever "practicable."
See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (an
out-of-court hearing is not automatically required for
determining the admissibility of identification evidence).

The U.S. Supreme Court considered this issue in Crane

v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 2142 (1986). The defendant moved
to suppress a confession on the grounds that it had been
coerced. The trial court determined that the confession
was voluntary and denied the motion. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning the
psychological and physical environment in which the
confession was obtained to show that it was unreliable.
The trial court excluded the evidence because it related
to the voluntariness issue.
·On review, the Court reversed. Citing Federal Rule
104(e), the Court stated that the circumstances surrounding the.taking~of a confession may be relevant to two separate issues, one legal and one factual. The legal issue
concerns the constitutional issue of voluntariness, which
the court must decide. The factual issue concerns thereiiability of the confession, an issue which the jury decides.
According to the Court, the preclusion of evidence on the
latter issue: deprived the defendant of a fair trial:
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment ... or in the Compulsory
Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment ... , the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense." /d. at 2146 (quoting California v. Trombetta,
467 u.s. 479, 485 (1984).
See also State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216, 220, 456
N.E.2d 1287 (1982); State v. Cron, 14 Ohio App.2d 76,
236 N.E.2d 671 (1967).

Testimony by the Accused
Scope of cross-examination. Rule 104(0) limits the
scope of cross-examination when a criminal defendant
testifies on a preliminary matter; such testimony does not
subject the defendant "to cross-examination as to other
issues in the case." "The limitation upon cross-examination is designed to encourage participation by the accused in the determination of preliminary matters. He
may testify concerning them without eXposing himself to
cross-examination generally." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. A specific ruleoll ci"oss-'examination on preliminary matters was considered necessary
because Rule 611(8) adopts the wide-open rule on scope
of cross-examination in all other proceedings.
Subsequent use at trial. As both the Ohio Staff Note
and federal Advisory Committee's Note indicate, Rule
104(0) does not address the issue of whether the
accused's testimony on a preliminary matter can be used
sYbse_qJJf:l.ntly a,ttrial. !3oth t~e Qhioailttf~9~r?l h()tes
cite several decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.

RULE 105: LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
Rule 105 recognizes the principle of limited admissibility:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party
or for anotherpurpose is admitted, the court, upon
request of a party, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
In many instances, an item of evidence can be used for
multiple purposes. In some cases this is proper. For
example, a party's prior inconsistent statement may be
admitted for impeachment (Rule 613), as well as for
substantive evidence as an admission (Rule 801(0)(2)(a))
Frequently, however, an item of evidence may be admissible for one purpose but inadmissible for another
purpose. Evidence also may be admissible against one
party, but not against another party. In such cases Rule
105 applies, and the court must, upon request, instruct
the jury as to the limited purpose of the evidence. The
rule does not preclude the trial court from giving such a
limiting instruction sua sponte.
Rule 105 does not change prior Ohio law. In an early
case, Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St. 264 (1869), the
Supreme Court noted that "[i]nstructions advising the
jury of the object for which particular items of evidence
are admitted, and cautioning them against being misled
by their improper use, are certainly proper, and are often
called for by the circumstances of the case ..."/d. at 270.
See Ohio Jury Instructions§ 2.60, 5.90 and 402.60 (limited purpose evidence).
Rule 105 is written in mandatory language. Upon
request, a limiting instruction must be given. Refusal to
instruct is error. See United States v. Washington, 592

In Simmons v. Unit~c:l $Jates •. ~~Q.I,L§:.~~Zl J!~!l-~l. !D~
Court held that suppression hearing testimony given by a
defendant in order to establish standing to object to illegally seized evidence could not be used against the
defendant at trial on the issue of guilt. See also Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Whether the Simmons
rule extends to the impeachment use of suppression
hearing testimony has not yet been decided; the· court
specifically reserved that question in United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). However, in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court held that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach
a defendant at trial. See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
(1975). Similarly, the Court has permitted the impeachment
use of evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
Weight and Credibility
Rule 104(E) provides: "This rule does not limit the right
of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant
to weight or credibility." The purpose of this provision is
to make clear that a court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence does not curtail the right of a party to dispute
the reliability of admitted evidence before the jury. For
example, if the trial court determines, as a matter of
constitutional law, that a confession is voluntary, the
defendant may nevertheless introduce before the jury
evidence challenging the reliability of the confession.
6

F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1979).
The rule not only directs the court to give a limiting
instruction upon request, it also requires the courts to
"restrict the evidence to its proper scope." This phrase is
not explained in the federal Advisory Committee's Note
or in the Ohio Staff Note. One purpose of this phrase is to
limit counsel's use of the evidence to its proper purpose
during closing argument. See Drake v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 346, 348, 474 N.E.2d 291 (1984) (error
for counsel to refer in closing argument to evidence admitted solely for impeachment as if such evidence were
substantive); United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 919 {3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 {1975). This provision
would also apply to a bench trial, where the court is
required to limit its use of the evidence to its proper
purpose but where no instruction is given. See 21 Wright
& Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5067 {1977).

~~

Timing of Instruction
A limiting instruction could be given either at the time
the evidence is admitted or at the close of the case. In
Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 {1922),
the Supreme Court held that a limiting instruction could
be given at the time of admission or in the general
charge. In Findlay Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50 Ohio St. 560,
35 N.E. 55 (1893), the Court required the instruction to be
given at the time evidence was received.
The language of Rule 105 seems to require that the
instruction be given at the time evidence is introduced:
"When evidence . .. is admitted, the court, upon request
of a party, shall ... instruct the jury ..."(emphasis added)
This interpretation is further supported by the rationale
underlying Rule 105; the instruction will be more effective
at the time the evidence is admitted. The federal cases,
however, have not accepted this reading of the rule. See
United States v. Wei!, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 839-40 (7th Cir.
1977); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 362
{9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 {1976).
Failure to Request an Instruction
The failure of a party to request a limiting instruction
has been held to constitute a waiver. See Agler v. Schine
Theatrical Co., 59 Ohio App. 68, 17 N.E.2d 118 (1938).
Not all of the Ohio cases, however, have applied the waiver rule. See Kroger Co. v. McCarty, 111 Ohio App. 362,
172 N.E.2d 463 (1960). Failure to request a limiting
instruction should be considered a waiver, except in
those instances in which the plain error rule applies
(Rule 103(0)). See United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236,
1244 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d
754, 757 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982);
United States v. Vitale, 596 F.2d 688,689 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); United States v.
Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 622-26 (5th Cir. 1976).
To support a finding of plain error despite counsel's
failure to request a limiting instruction, an appellate court
must determine that the trial court should have given the
instruction sua sponte, or, at least, should have asked
counsel whether an instruction was desired. In some
situations, the failure to request a limiting instruction is a
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deliberate tactic employed to avoid overemphasizing
adverse evidence. If competent counsel chooses this
course of action, the plain error rule should not apply.
See United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 920 (7th
Cir.1983) ("It appears to us that the defendant's attorney
merely made a tactical decision in declining to ask that
this statement be struck and a limiting instruction be
given. Such a tactical decision should not increase the
defendant's chances of obtaining a reversal."); United
States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Counsel may refrain from requesting an instruction in
order not to emphasize potentially damaging evidence ...".

Evidence Admissible for One Purpose
In numerous situations an item of evidence may be
admissible if offered for one purpose, but inadmissible if
offered for another purpose. See United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) ("But there is no rule of evidence
which provides that testimony admissible for one
purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby
rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.");
State ex ref. Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 1 Ohio
St.3d 151, 156, 438 N.E.2d 120 (1982) ("It is fundamental
that evidence that is admissible for one purpose may be
inadmissible for another purpose.").
The Rules of Evidence specifically address some of
these issues. For example, Rule 404(8) provides that
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for several purposes, including proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, or identity. Such evidence, however,
"is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." An
instruction limiting such evidence to its proper purpose is
appropriate. See Ohio Jury Instructions§ 402.61 and 405.23.
The doctrine of limited admissibility applies to many
situations which the Rules of Evidence do not explicitly
address. For example, prior inconsistent statements are
generally admissible only for the purpose of impeachment. (There is an exception for prior inconsistent statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(0)(1)(a)).
If offered for impeachment, the statement is relevant only
because it was made and is inconsistent with in-court
testimony, not because it was true. If the jury uses the
statement for the truth of its content, the hearsay rule is
violated. Accordingly, an instruction limiting the jury's
use of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment is
appropriate. See G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty
Co, 166 Ohio St. 401, 405, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957) (prior
confession of testifying witness "admissible for only the
purpose of impeachment of her testimony").
Similarly, evidence of prior convictions typically is
admissible only for impeachment. See Rule 609. There is
a danger, however, that when such evidence is
introduced the jury might use it as character evidence on
the merits of the case, especially if the witness is the
accused in a criminal case. This latter use of prior conviction evidence is prohibited by Rule 404(A); hence, an
instruction limiting the use of this type of evidence is
appropriate. See State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174
N.E.2d 543 {1961) (syllabus, para. 2) ("conviction of a
witness for an offense ... may be shown for the purpose
of affecting his credibility"); Ohio Jury Instructions§
402.60 and 405.22. ·

Evidence Admissible Against One Party

Second, the prosecution can delete.(redact}aiLreferences in the confession that relate to the codefendant.
See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n. 10
(1968); State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 342, 86 N.E.2d
24 (1949). Redaction, however, is not always effective.
"There are, of course, instances in which such editing is
not possible; the references to the codefendant may be
so frequent or so closely interrelated with references to
the maker's conduct that little would be left of the statement after editing." ABA Standards Relating to Joinder
and Severance 38 (1967). The Supreme Court sanctioned the redaction procedure in Richardson v. Marsh,
107~S.Gt: 1702 (1987): "We hold that the Confrontation
Clause is not violated by the admission ofa nontestifying
codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to
her existence." /d. at 1709.

Rule 105 provides that when an item of evidence is
admissible against one party, but not against another
party, a limiting instruction must be given upon request,
directing the jury to use the evidence against the proper
party. See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.40 (several
defendants); Webb v. Grimm, 116 Ohio App. 63, 186
N.E.2d 739 (1961).
The U.S. Supreme Court held in-Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that a limiting instruction in a
joint trial was insufficient to protect against improper jury
use of one defendant's confession which implicated a
codefendant. Once the Court concludedthat there existed a "substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to
the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining the petitioner's guilt," it ruled
that the defendant had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because his right to crossexamine the codefendant about the statement had been
foreclosed. !d. at 126. In subsequent decisions, the Court
held Bruton applicable to state trials (see Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968)), and subject to the harmless error doctrine (see Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969)). See also State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150,
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d
167, 255 N.E.2d 861 (1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio
App.2d 123, 123 n. 1, 247 N.E.2d 482, 483 n. 1 (1969).
There are several ways in which the Bruton issue can
be obviated. First, separate trials avoid the problem
raised in Bruton. If the codefendants have been properly
joined for trial under Crim. R. 8(B), the proper remedy is
a motion to sever for prejudice pursuant to Crim. R.
12(B)(5)and 14.The trial court has discretion to grant
such a motion. If codefendants have been improperly
joined under Crim. R. 8(E3), the.Pf<JPE!f remedy is a
motion for severance for misjoinder pursuant to Crim. R.
8 and 12(B)(2). In such cases, the defendant need not
show prejudice, and the trial judge must sever. See
generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Crim. R.
8 and Crim. R. 14.

Third, the Bruton problem can be avoided, at least in
some instances, if the codefendant testifies at trial.
Under these circumstances the defendant has the oppor·
tunity to cross-examine the codefendant on the accuracy
of the out-of-court statement, thereby obviating the
confrontation issue. The Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971): "We
conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his
own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court
statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to
testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been denied no rights
protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." /d.
at 629-30. See also State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112,
381 N.E.2d 960 (1978).
·~
The Court has decided several other Bruton issues. In
CnJZ v. New York, 107 S.Ct. 1714 (1987), the C()wrt held
that Bruton applied to "interlocking confessions:' In
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), the Court ruled
that Bruton was not violated by the prosecution's use of
an accomplice's statement in rebuttal.
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